We give an exposition and numerical studies of upper hedging prices in multinomial models from the viewpoint of linear programming and the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk. We also show that, as the number of rounds goes to infinity, the upper hedging price of a European option converges to the solution of the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation.
Introduction
The Black-Scholes formula for the geometric Brownian motion model and the Cox-RossRubinstein formula for the binomial model are now treated in many standard textbooks on mathematical finance (e.g. [13, 21, 22] ). Since these models are complete, the exact price for any contingent claim is determined by arbitrage argument. On the other hand, incomplete models such as the trinomial model are only briefly mentioned in the textbooks because of difficulty associated with indeterminacy of prices of contingent claims.
In fact only a few explicit results seem to be known on upper hedging prices for the discrete-time multinomial models. The purpose of this paper is to give an exposition of the exact and the asymptotic behavior of upper hedging prices of contingent claims in multinomial models. We also show that the asymptotic upper hedging price of a European option is described by the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation (e.g. [1] , [26] , [9] , [12] , Chapter 4 of [15] ). The Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation is usually considered for uncertain volatility models in continuous time and its relation to multinomial models does not seem to be stated in literature.
The advantage of discrete-time multinomial models is that we can exactly compute the upper hedging price by backward induction for moderate number of rounds and various approximations to the upper hedging price can be compared to the exact value. Basic facts on the upper hedging price for discrete models are well explained in Chapter 4 of the first edition of Musiela and Rutkowski [13] . General treatments of incomplete markets are given in Chapter 5 of [10] and [18] . However they are concerned with continuous stochastic processes and do not contain much numerical information on the behavior of upper hedging prices for discrete models.
An extensive numerical study of hedging in incomplete markets is given in [3] . Its authors consider a hedging strategy which minimizes the mean-squared error to the payoff of a contingent claim under Markov-state dynamics. As we see in Section 2 below, for studying the behavior of upper hedging prices we can not make convenient stochastic assumptions such as the Markov property. Results more relevant to the present paper have been given in [17] and [5] by convex ordering argument. In particular for discrete time models with bounded martingale differences, [17] proves that the upper hedging price of a convex contingent claim is given by the extremal binomial model. We reproduce this fact in Proposition 2.4 below by linear programming argument.
In this paper we use the framework of game-theoretic probability by Shafer and Vovk. We prefer the framework because of the following reasons. First, in game-theoretic probability only the protocol of a game between "Investor" and "Market" is formulated without specification of a probability measure. Therefore there is no need to distinguish a risk neutral measure from an actual (or a physical) measure and to consider the equivalence between them. This is advantageous because the extremal risk neutral measure corresponding to the upper hedging price usually has a support smaller than those in the interior of the set of risk neutral measures. Second, some strong properties of a price path of Market can be proved in game-theoretic probability without any stochastic assumption (e.g. see [25] , [27] , [28] and references therein). As a referee pointed out [4] studies nonprobabilistic approach for pricing in continuous time. Third, the notion of upper hedging price is of central importance to game-theoretic probability as shown in our recent works ( [24] , [20] ) on game-theoretic probability.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give a linear programming formulation of upper hedging prices in multinomial models and state some basic facts in several propositions. In Section 3 we give some simple bounds for upper hedging prices. Then in Section 4 we show that, as the number of rounds goes to infinity, the upper hedging price of a European option converges to the solution of an additive form of the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation. In Section 5 we present numerical studies on the accuracy of the partial differential equation and other approximations. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
Formulation of upper hedging price
In this section we formulate the upper hedging price for a multinomial game from the viewpoint of linear programming and the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk [19] . Also we show some known facts on upper hedging prices.
Let X ⊂ R be a finite set containing both negative and positive elements. The protocol of the multinomial game of N rounds with the initial capital of K 0 = α is written as follows.
Investor announces M n ∈ R.
Market announces x n ∈ X .
We call X N the sample space and ξ = x 1 . . . x N ∈ X N a path of Market's moves. For 1 ≤ n ≤ N, ξ n = x 1 . . . x n ∈ X n is a partial path. Investor's strategy P is a function specifying M n based on ξ n−1 = x 1 . . . x n−1 :
with some initial value M 1 = P( ), where denotes the initial empty path. When Investor adopts P, his capital at the end of round n is written as α + K P n , where
We can write the progression of the game in a rooted tree with the root . For n < N, ξ n is an intermediate node branching to ξ n x n+1 , x n+1 ∈ X . The final nodes are ξ ∈ X N . We call a function f : X N → R a payoff function or a contingent claim. The upper hedging price (or simply the upper price) of f is defined as
and the lower hedging price is defined as
The upper hedging price and the lower hedging price are often called seller's price and buyer's price, respectively. A strategy P with the initial capital α satisfying α + K
N , is called a superreplicating strategy for f . The problem of obtaining the upper hedging price can be formulated in linear programming. Let X = {a 1 , . . . , a k }. For the single step case N = 1,Ē(f ) is obtained as the following minimum:
For the two-step case N = 2, Investor can choose his investment at round 2 depending on the Market's move in the first round. ThereforeĒ(f ) is written as the following minimum:
where 1 k is a k-dimensional vector of 1's,Â N is A N without the first column and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Then
where f is a k N -dimensional vector consisting of f (ξ), ξ ∈ X N , and
Since the size of A N grows exponentially with N, it becomes difficult to directly solve the linear programming problem for a general path-dependent contingent claim f . Exploiting the recursive structure of the coefficient matrix A N , the linear programming problem can be solved by backward induction, i.e. by solving the single-step optimizations for N, N − 1, . . . , 1. This will be explicitly described in (8) below. Therefore the singlestep optimization in (2) is essential. However even with backward induction, for a general path-dependent f , the number of single-step optimizations grows exponentially with N. This is because the number of nodes of the game tree grows exponentially with N and the single-step optimization for the backward induction is performed at each node of the game tree. This difficulty is somewhat mitigated in the case of a European option f , where f is a function of S N = x 1 + · · · + x N only. Then the game tree can be collapsed according to the values of S n = x 1 + · · · + x n and the number of nodes of the collapsed tree grows only polynomially with N. In fact, for generic values of a 1 , . . . , a k , the number of values taken by S N is
. Now we consider the single-step optimization in (2) . Let X contain l negative elements and m = k − l positive elements, which are ordered as
Note that we allow the case a 1 + = 0, which needs some special consideration. For the single-step game the following result is given in Proposition 4.1.1 of [13] . We give our own proof based on consideration of dual linear programming problem to (2).
Proposition 2.1. The upper hedging price of f in the single-step game N = 1 is given byĒ
⊤ and consider the following dual problem to (2):
Note that the coefficient matrix is 2 × k. Therefore the maximum is attained by a basic solution involving two variables. First consider the case a 
and the value of the objective function is given by (a
, which is consistent with (5) and (6) . Therefore this case does not require a separate statement. This proves the proposition.
By (1) the lower hedging price E(f ) for the single-step game is given as
The vector p satisfying (5) is a probability vector over X such that its expectation is zero:
Let P 1 denote the set of probability vectors satisfying (5). p ∈ P 1 is called a risk neutral measure on X . From (5) we haveĒ(f ) = max
, where E p [·] denotes the usual expectation under p. This duality is well known in great generality (see Chapter 5 of [10] ). However the explicit expression of the upper hedging price in (4) is useful for the purpose of numerical backward induction for N ≥ 2.
Remark 2.2. We can also consider the dual problem to (3) for the N-step problem. It is easy to see that the set P N of risk neutral measures p = {p(ξ), ξ ∈ X n } is characterized as follows:
Also by duality we haveĒ(
. Note that (7) holds even if p(ξ) = 0 for some ξ and some conditional probabilities on the right-hand side are not defined. At each node of the game tree, the conditional distribution of the extremal risk neutral measure corresponding toĒ(f ) is given by a basic solution of the form (4).
Based on (4), the backward induction for obtainingĒ(f ) for the N-step game is described as follows. Definef (·, N − n) :
Summarizing the arguments above we have the following proposition. Proposition 2.3. The upper hedging price of f in the N-step game is given bȳ
Consider the case that the payoff f is defined on the whole R N . Then we have the following result. 
This result was proved by Rüschendorf ([17] ) by a convex ordering argument in a more general setting, where X is a bounded interval. See also [5] . Corresponding results for concave f are obtained by using (1) . We now give a simple proof of this proposition using (8) .
Proof. First consider the one-step game N = 1. By convexity of f it is easy to check that for any a − i and a + j the following inequalities hold:
Hence the proposition holds for the single-step game.
For N > 1 we can use the induction. We note thatf (ξ
where the weights of the combination are given by the binomial model and they do not depend on ξ n . In particularf (ξ n , N − n) is convex in x n . Remark 2.5. As pointed out in Remark 2 of [17] , the above result holds if f is componentwise convex in every x i , i = 1, . . . , N.
Some bounds for upper hedging prices
In this section we present some simple inequalities for upper hedging prices.
We first investigate the relation between binomial model and general multinomial model. Pick a negative element a − i and a positive element a + j from X and restrict the move space X of Market to the two element set X i,j = {a
Then the multinomial game is reduced to a binomial model, where the price of any contingent claim is given by an arbitrage argument. Let E i,j (f ) denote the price of f under the binomial model X i,j . For the two-element set X i,j there is no need to take the maximum in (8) . On the other hand, for a multinomial model X we take the maximum in (8) at each node of the game. This gives the following lower bound forĒ(f ):
Similarly for the lower hedging price we have
The above inequalities can be generalized by considering nested move spaces of Market. Explicitly writing X in the multinomial game, letĒ(f | X ) and E(f | X ) denote the upper hedging price and the lower hedging price of multinomial game with X as Market's move space. Consider two nested move spaces X ⊂ X ′ of Market. Then the same consideration as above gives the following inequalities:
In Section 5 we compare upper and lower hedging prices in trinomial and quadnomial models.
We can also consider dynamic restrictions of the move space of Market. For example, we can consider the maximization in (8) only for even n = 2h and use the maximizer i * , j * from this round for the subsequent round n = 2h + 1. Or we can maximize e.g. every 10th step. By this dynamic restriction we again have a lower bound for the upper hedging price. As we discuss in the next section, this pruning of maximizations is conceptually close to discretization of partial differential equation in (13) . We now present another bound when f is a European option depending only on S N . Let f be defined on the whole R. Assume that f has the first derivative f ′ which is of bounded variation. Then f ′ is written as a difference of two non-decreasing functions (Section 5.2 of [16] ). By taking the indefinite integral of f ′ we see that f is written as a sum of a convex function and a concave function:
By the subadditivity of the upper hedging price (Section 8.3 of [19] ), we havē
The bounds in (9) and (11) . We consider a sequence of multinomial games with N rounds, where the payoff f N for the N-th game is given as
Note that the expected value under the two-point distribution in (6) is zero and the variance is given as
In view of this define the maximum variance and the minimum variance of P 1 as
We now state the following theorem. whereφ(s, t), s ∈ R, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, satisfies the following partial differential equation
with the boundary conditionφ(s, 0) = f (s), s ∈ R.
Similarly the following partial differential equation describes the limiting lower price of f N . ∂ ∂t φ(s, t) =σ
∂s 2 φ(s, t),
We can understand (13) as a piecewise heat equation, where the diffusion coefficient depends on the convexity or concavity ofφ. As pointed out by a referee the equation (13) is studied in [14] . We stated Theorem 4.1 for the simple setting of σ 2 > 0 and f ∈ C 2 b . Theorem 4.6.9 of [15] states that the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation holds for a payoff function with linear growth condition: for some a, b > 0, |f (s)| ≤ a + b|s|, ∀s ∈ R. In view of this result we expect our Theorem 4.1 also holds for continuous f satisfying a linear growth condition. However justifying the limiting argument from discrete time to continuous time does not seem to be simple. Remark 4.2. The case σ 2 = 0 needs a special consideration, although Theorem 4.1 still holds for this case. In view of Theorem 4.6.9 of [15] , the notion of viscosity solution (cf. [7] ) is needed for (13) .
In Section 6.3 of [19] this case was treated using parabolic potential theory. The equivalence of (13) to the treatment in Section 6.3 of [19] is seen by the following intuitive argument. If σ 2 = 0, then (∂/∂t)φ(s, t) ≥ 0, ∀s, t, andφ is non-decreasing in t.φ strictly increases in t at some (s 0 , t 0 ) if and only ifφ(s, t) is strictly convex in s at this point. Then for all t ≥ t 0 ,φ(s, t) is (at least weakly) convex in s. This implies thatσ 2 =σ 2 if and only ifφ(s, t) > f (s), which corresponds to the "continuous region" in Section 6.3 of [19] .
The numerical behavior of (13) for this case is well illustrated in Figure 6 .2 of [19] . It should also be noted thatφ(s, ∞) = lim t→∞φ (s, t) is the least concave majorant (concave envelope) of f .
Note that (13) is an additive form of the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation in which the right-hand side of (13) multiplied by s 2 :
Consider a multiplicative model, where Reality chooses positive x n 's and S N = x 1 × · · · × x N is the product of x n 's. A European option is of the form f (S N ). In (20) A rigorous proof of our theorem is somewhat tedious and we first give some heuristic arguments as to why (13) should hold. Later we give a more formal proof, by considering an approximate superreplicating strategy as in Section 6.2 of [19] .
For our argument it is more convenient to rescale the move space of Market in the N-th game to
After this rescaling, the backward induction in (8) for the N-th game is written as
where s = S n and p Hence in each interval of convexity or concavity off N (s, N − n), it is twice continuously differentiable in s. In our numerical studies we found that if the payoff function f is smooth and has only finite number of inflection points, thenf N (s, N − n) as a function of s has no more inflection points than f .
Write ν = N − n − 1. Then each term in the right-hand side of (17) is expanded as
where derivatives are with respect s and |NR N | = o(1) uniformly in s and ν. Then (17) is written as
If we ignore NR N = o(1), the right hand side is maximized by (i, j) = (l, m) or (i, j) = (1, 1) depending on the sign off ′′ N (s, ν). Now by rescaling time axis definē
Then (18) is written as
This clearly corresponds to (13) . However it seems difficult to let N → ∞ in (19) and prove our theorem directly, although the finite difference approximation to HJB equations in Chapter IX of [8] should hold in some form. At this point we indicate how the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation (15) arises in the multiplicative case. In the multiplicative multinomial model, x n is assumed to be of the form x n − 1 ∈ X N , where X N is given in (16) . Let S n = x 1 × · · · × x n . Then
The expansion of the right-hand side of (17) in the multiplicative model is
This corresponds to (15) . Instead of the above direct approach, knowing that (13) should hold, we can construct an approximate superreplicating strategy of Investor and prove our theorem as in Section 6.2 of [19] . In the following proof, in order to show the inequalityφ(0, 1) ≥ lim sup NĒ (f N ) we adopt a suggestion by a referee.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Theorem 4.6.9 of [15] , the solutionφ to (13) has a continuous first-order derivative in t and a continuous second-order derivative in s. See also Theorem 11 of [9] and [26] . Consider the following sequencē
we can expand the successive difference as
where NR N = o(1) is uniformly in s and t. Consider a Markov superhedging strategy P (cf. [9] ) of Investor which chooses M n = (∂/∂s)φ(S n , D n ). By adding (21) for n = 1, . . . , N we have
At this point we adopt a suggestion by a referee. From Proposition 2.1 and Remark 2.2 we know that the upper hedging price is computed as the expected value of f (S N ) under the extremal risk neutral measure, say p * = p * N . Under any risk neutral measure, K P n , n = 1, . . . , N, is a measure-theoretic martingale and its expected value is zero. Now consider the expected value of
under p * . We can evaluate the expected value, first by conditioning on x 1 , . . . , x n . By the definition ofσ 2 , under p * the conditional variance of
Therefore taking the unconditional expected value of (22) under p * we haveĒ(f N ) − φ(0, 1) ≤ 0 except for a term of order o(1). Hence lim sup NĒ (f N ) ≤φ(0, 1).
Conversely, consider Market's randomized moves chosen according to the extremal risk neutral measure corresponding toĒ(f N ), which is concentrated to two outermost values {a 2). Investor's capital is a measure-theoretic martingale under this risk neutral measure. Since the measure is supported on two points at each node of the game tree, we can modify the standard argument for binomial models to show that the expected value of the payoff f converges toφ(0, 1) under the measure. On the other handĒ(f N ) is the supremum over all possible moves of Market. Therefore we havē
Remark 4.3. In the above proof we partly used measure theoretic arguments as suggested by a referee. Although we can give a purely game theoretic proof in the line of Section 6.2 of [19] , it is somewhat tedious. The difficulty lies in the fact that ∂ 2 ∂s 2φ (S n , D n ) is pathdependent. Note that by the game-theoretic law of large numbers ( [19] , [11] ), Investor can force that S N / √ N converge to 0. This implies that for large N the empirical distribution of Market's moves is approximately a risk neutral measure and
2 is the variance of a risk neutral measure. However because each (dS n ) 2 is multiplied by
Although the argument can be fixed by discretization of the values of
∂s 2φ (S n , D n ), we omit the details.
Numerically (13) can be solved by the following backward induction: 1) discretization of the interval [0, 1] and R, 2) approximation of the second derivative (∂ 2 /∂s 2 )φ by the second order difference of three neighboring points. Actually this backward induction is entirely similar to the exact backward induction in (8) . When the discretization is not fine enough, then the above numerical approximation corresponds to pruning of maximizations discussed in Section 3. This suggests that a coarse discretization of the partial differential equation yields an approximation which is less than the the trueφ(s, 0).
Numerical examples
In this section we check results of this paper by numerical computation.
We We now add a new Market's move a 4 to the trinomial model and compare the former trinomial model (a 1 = −1, a 2 = 1, a 3 = 2) to this quadnomial model. We consider the following three values of a 4 as depicted in Figure 3 . Next we consider the payoff f = sin(10S n ), which has a lot of changes from convexity to concavity, and similarly calculate the upper hedging prices. The results are shown in Figures 7, 8, 9 . Also in this case the upper hedging prices under the quadnomial model equal those under the trinomial model with increasing N, provided that a 4 = 1.5.
Next, we vary the values of a 4 from 0 to 5 by 0.1. Figure 10 displays the plot of the upper hedging prices of the butterfly spread for 1 ≤ N ≤ 50 and 0 ≤ a 4 ≤ 5. From Figure 10 , we see that the upper hedging prices converge to an equal value in the interval 1 ≤ a 4 ≤ 2. 
We set σ 2 = 1 andσ 2 = 2 (13). For discretization we use ∆t = and ∆s = 1 10 , we obtainφ(0, 1) ≈ 0.3817 and φ(0, 1) ≈ 0.2060 using difference scheme (24) . In Figure  12 , we compute (14) for the lower prices by the similar difference method. Table 1 shows the upper prices and the lower prices obtained in Figure 2 . We find that these converge to the values obtained by the difference method for the partial differential equations (13) and (14) . 6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we discussed various approximations and asymptotics of upper hedging prices in multinomial models. In particular we showed that, as the number of rounds goes to infinity, the upper hedging price of a European option converges to the solution of an additive form of the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation. By numerical experiments we checked that this convergence is fast and the asymptotic approximation is useful. A multinomial model is the simplest example of incomplete market. A natural extension of a multinomial model is the bounded forecasting game ( [19] ), where Market's move is a bounded interval containing the origin. This problem was already considered in [17] . Most results of this paper can be extended to the bounded forecasting game.
Usually the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation is studied in the case of vector-valued processes. Then the maximum variance and the minimum variance are no longer uniquely determined and the maximization in each step of the game tree is more complicated. Numerical studies of vector-valued cases are left to our future investigation.
